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Abstract
In this paper we provide a strongly complete axiomatization of a tem-
poral epistemic logic in which non-rigid sets of agents are allowed. Using
this framework, we prove a number of properties of the blockchain proto-
col with respect to the given set of axioms and premises.
Keywords: multi-agent systems, blockchain, temporal epistemic logic,
formal model, specification/verification.
1 Introduction
Study of epistemic and tense logics started, if not earlier, in the 1950s, 1960s
with [20, 35]. Since then, reasoning about knowledge and time has been applied
in many fields. Particularly, it has been proven useful in analyzing message-
passing based protocols in distributed computer networks [15, 16, 17], where a
suitable semantics was proposed, and modal operators are used to express both
agents’ knowledge and temporal properties of actions in distributed systems.
In this paper, we provide a strongly complete 1 Hilbert-style axiomatization
of a temporal epistemic logic with respect to Kripke-like semantics in which the
set of active agents need not be rigid, i.e., an agent may alternately become
active and nonactive. This property of agents implies that knowledge does not
satisfy that everything which is known is true (and in that sense it might be also
called belief [15]), so a knowledge of an agent a is described using the modal
operator Ka, that is interpreted with a symmetric and transitive indistinguisha-
bility (accessibility) relation, while the temporal part of the logic is discrete
1“every consistent set of formulas is satisfiable”, in contrast to weakly complete—“every
consistent formula is satisfiable”
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linear time (future) LTL logic, where the flow of time is isomorphic to the nat-
ural numbers, and the corresponding part of the formal language contains the
operators Next (©) and Until (U). The epistemic part is formalized using the
multi-agent modal logic KB4 (since reflexivity is not required) with addition
of axioms and rules for common knowledge (denoted by the operator C), and
for the temporal part we follow the approach presented in [31]. We consider
two variants of our temporal epistemic logic. In the first one, we extend our
formal language so that, if the set of agents is non rigid, it is possible to reason
about knowledge of active agents. In the second logic, we deal with rigid sets
of agents and one of the standard characteristics of knowledge which says that
agents know only true facts. In that case accessibility relations should also be
reflexive. We provide complete axiomatizations for those systems.
We have already mentioned weak and strong completeness that connect the
syntactic and the semantic notions of consistency and satisfiability. Obviously,
weak completeness follows trivially from the strong one, but the opposite direc-
tion is not straightforward. Here the notion of compactness (“a set of formulas
is satisfiable iff every finite subset of it is satisfiable”) plays an important role.
For logics that fulfill compactness for every set of formulas, strong completeness
is a consequence of weak completeness (e.g., in classical logic). However, there
are logics where compactness fails, and there are unsatisfiable sets of formulas
that are finitely satisfiable (“every finite subset is satisfiable”). Actually, both
the temporal logic LTL and the epistemic logic are not compact. In case of
non-compact logics, strong completeness does not follow from the weak one.
Namely, having a finitary (i.e., recursive) sound and weakly complete axiomatic
system, it is not possible to prove inconsistency of an unsatisfiable, but finitely
satisfiable, set F of formulas, because every finite proof uses only finite number
of formulas from F , every finite subset of F is satisfiable, and, by soundness,
cannot be proven inconsistent. To avoid that logical obstacle, we provide here
an axiomatization containing infinitary inference rules (with countable many
premises and one consequence), which, because of strong completeness, guaran-
tee that every unsatisfiable set of formulas is inconsistent. We emphasize that in
this paper the term infinitary concerns the meta language only, i.e., the object
language is countable, and formulas are finite, while proofs are allowed to be
infinite.
Nowadays, one of the most popular distributed protocols is the blockchain
protocol [30], which is used, for example, to synchronise copies of the public
ledger in the bitcoin cryptocurrency. In the formal language of our logic we
formulate a theory related to the definition of blockchain and illustrate the
expressiveness of the logic by reasoning about properties of the protocol.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• we present a temporal epistemic logic in which the set of active agents is
allowed to change over time,
• we present the corresponding infinitary axiomatization and prove its strong
completeness with respect to a class of Kripke-like models, and
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• to illustrate the expressiveness of the presented formal language, we pro-
vide a description of the synchronous version of the blockchain protocol
as a theory in the logic.
Finally, we note that, although we consider only propositional logic in this
paper, our approach can be extended to the first order case. It is well known that
in case of some first order logics (e.g., first order dynamic logic [11], first order
LTL [38], first order probability logic [1], etc.), there are no sound and complete
finitary axiomatic systems. However, strongly complete axiomatization can be
obtained by adding infinitary inference rules [12, 31, 33].
1.1 Related work
Temporal and epistemic logics are broadly analyzed in the literature. Here we
will mention some of the relevant papers and books. John Burgess [8] discussed
a propositional temporal language with the operators Since and Until intro-
duced in [22], and presented weak completeness proofs for a number of classes
of temporal models. The ability to describe properties of programs using the
future-time linear discrete temporal logic LTL with the operators © and U
particularly focused research on it [25]. The paper [24] gave a comprehensive
analysis of propositional LTL (also including the past operators Previous and
Since) and provided a weakly complete axiomatization. The paper [37] was the
first proposing an infinitary Prawitz-type natural deduction system for propo-
sitional LTL with the operators © and Always (G). The proposed infinitary
rule
{©n+kA : k = 0, 1, 2, . . .} ` ©nGA
can be intuitively read as ”(in every future time instant) if A holds, and A holds
in the next time instant, and in the time instant after it, etc., then A always
holds”.
The books [15, 28] gave systematic overviews of the field of epistemic logic.
To characterize properties of knowledge they used finitary axiomatizations based
on modal systems S5 and KD45. In [15] infinitary nature of common knowledge
was captured using finitary Induction inference rule
A→ EG(B ∧A) ` A→ CGB,
where EG denotes that everyone in the group G knows. In [36] temporal, epis-
temic and dynamic propositional modal logics with infinitary inference rules
were discussed. The logics were given in the form of natural deduction systems
with infinitary sets of premises in inference rules while proof trees remained
finite. The paper also justified the need for such infinitary rules by noting the
above mentioned compactness issue. Completeness proofs for the considered
logics were given. A particular example was the epistemic logic with common
knowledge characterized with the following infinitary rule
{Ka0 . . . Kak−1A : k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ai′s are agents } ` CA.
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The paper [23] proposed several formal systems to describe combinations of
knowledge, belief and time, but did not find the corresponding classes of models
for which the systems are complete. In [15] an interaction of knowledge and
time was considered and finitary weakly complete axiomatization was provided.
Finitary axiomatizations for a number of discrete linear time temporal epistemic
logics were given in [19]. The temporal part of the formal language contains ©
and U, while the epistemic part covers the cases of a single agent, and of multiple
agents with common knowledge. Several properties of agents were discussed
and, while some of them cannot be recursively axiomatized, finitary axiomatic
systems were given to the other ones using the above mentioned Induction rule.
One of usual assumptions in temporal epistemic framework is that the set of
agents is rigid (all agents are active during any execution of a protocol), but
the paper [18] considers also sets of agents that are non-rigid, i.e., agents can
temporarily switch from active to inactive and vice versa.
On the other hand, there are not many papers providing formal logical anal-
ysis of the blockchain protocol. In [5] a dynamic logic BCL was introduced to
describe how an agent’s knowledge is changed when a new block that might be
added to the blockchain arrives. The paper [18] presented a model-theoretic
approach to address the issue of achieving consensus on a public ledger imple-
mented as a blockchain, where it is allowed that some of the agents can enter
and leave the network. The paper used some variants of common knowledge
(i.e., ∆-, and ∆-2-common knowledge) that rely on the assumption that agents’
local clocks can be synchronized reasonably closely—with a delay of ∆ time in-
stants. A probabilistic extension of this approach (e.g., “what is the probability
that a transaction is in a ledger?”) is also discussed in [18].
The papers [10, 34] considered the blockchain protocol from a cryptographic
perspective. They are interested in possible influences of adversaries to the
protocol consistency. The paper [10] gave a probabilistic analysis of blockchain
assuming that the number of agents in a network remain fixed and that agents
are synchronized (which can be also understood as the requirement that time
is divided in such a way that messages are always instantly delivered without
delays). It was proved that with a high probability any two honest agents have
a large common prefix, and that in a chain of an honest agent the ratio of
blocks produced by adversaries are small. On the other hand, [34] argued that
synchronicity of a network is an unrealistic assumption, and applied its analysis
to an asynchronous setting. Assuming also a possibility that new agents join
a network while an instance of the blockchain protocol runs, the paper proved
generalization of the properties given in [10]. [34] also noticed that synchronous
protocols can be considered as ∆-delayed protocols, and that one could restrict
its focus on synchronous protocols as far as crypto-properties (like proof-of-
work) are not discussed.
1.2 Plan of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe syntax,
semantics and an axiomatic system for the considered temporal epistemic logic.
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Section 3 introduces the basics of the blockchain protocol and provides a theory
(a set of proper axioms). Relying on the presented strongly complete axiom-
atization we prove a number of properties of the protocol. Section 4 contains
concluding remarks and directions for further work. In Appendix A a proof of
strong completeness of the presented axiomatization is given.
2 Temporal Epistemic Logic
2.1 Syntax
Let N be the set of nonnegative integers, V ar a nonempty at most countable
set of propositional letters, and A = {a1, . . . , am}, where m ∈ N, a set of agents.
The set For of all formulas is the smallest superset of V ar which is closed under
the following formation rules:
• ψ 7→ ∗ψ where ∗ ∈ {¬,©, Ka, C}, where a ∈ A,
• 〈φ, ψ〉 7→ φ ∗ ψ where ∗ ∈ {∧, U}.
The operators ¬ and ∧ represent standard logical negation and conjunction.
The operators © and U are standard temporal operators Next and Until. The
operator Ka is read “agent a knows”, while C denotes common knowledge. The-
ories are sets of formulas.
The remaining logical, temporal and knowledge connectives ∨, Y, →, ↔, F,
G, E are defined in the usual way:
• φ ∨ ψ =def ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ),
• φ Y ψ =def (φ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬(φ ∧ ψ),
• φ→ ψ =def ¬φ ∨ ψ,
• φ↔ ψ =def (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ),
• Fψ =def (ψ → ψ)Uψ,
• Gψ =def ¬F¬ψ,
• ©0ψ =def ψ and ©n+1ψ =©©n ψ, n > 0,
• Eφ =def
∧
a∈A Kaφ, and
• E0ψ =def ψ and En+1ψ = EEnψ, n > 0.
We also define a sequence of formulas
Φk(τ, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
as k-nested implications based on the sequence of formulas (θj)j∈N in the fol-
lowing recursive way:
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• Φ0(τ, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) = θ0 → τ ,
• Φk+1(τ, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) = θk+1 → BkΦk(τ, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N),
where each Bk is a (possible empty) sequence of alternating blocks of the oper-
ators of the forms:
• ©li and
• Ka0 . . . Kaik .
For example,
Φ3(τ, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) = θ3 → Ka2(θ2 →©2Ka1 © (θ1 → (θ0 → τ))).
This definition follows the form of the probabilistic k-nested implications pre-
sented in [29, 39] and also of AF-programs from [2]. Formulas of this form are
used to formulate infinitary inference rules that are essential in the presented
axiomatization. The need of k-nested implications in inference rules comes di-
rectly from our completeness proof where they give a form of deep inference that
is essentially the same as nested sequents [3]. Deep inference refers to deductive
systems in which rules can not only be applied to outermost connectives but
also deep inside formulas.
2.2 Semantics
In this paper we will consider time flow which is isomorphic to the set N.
Since we are dealing with a multi-agent system where agents have to share
knowledge, the obvious choice is to use the logic of time and knowledge, where
models are propositional Kripke structures with possible worlds (i.e., possible
worlds are classical propositional models) that are essentially interpreted sys-
tems from [15].
Definition 1. A model M is any tuple 〈R, π,A,K〉 such that
• R is the set of runs, where:
– every run r is a countably infinite sequence of possible worlds r0, r1,
r2, . . . , and
– every possible world belongs to only one run.
• π = {πri : r ∈ R , i ∈ N} is the set of valuations:
– πri (q) ∈ {>,⊥}, for q ∈ V ar, associates truth values to propositional
letters of the possible world ri,
• A associates sets of active agents to possible worlds, and
• K = {Ka : a ∈ A} is the set of transitive and symmetric accessibility
relations for agents, such that:
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– if a 6∈ A(ri), then riKar′i′ is false for all r′ ∈ R and all i′ ∈ N.
We denote the class of all models with non rigid sets of agents by Modnr.
We will use Ka(ri) to denote the set of all possible worlds r′i′ such that
riKar′i′ . We mentioned above that our aim is to formalize systems in which
sets of active agents need not be rigid, which means that an agent a may be
active in some possible world ri and not active in some other r
′
m. This property
is formalized using the function A. Note that, if an agent a is not active in a
world ri, there is no world (including ri itself) accessible from ri by Ka. In the
terminology of the modal logics community such world is called dead end (wrt.
the agent a). The idea that riKar′i′ implies that a ∈ A(ri) can be traced back
at least to [13], where it is explained that ”this restriction is reasonable because
we do not want to ascribe knowledge to an agent at any world where he is not
present”. We will return to this after introducing the satisfiability relation in
Definition 2.
Figure 1: Kripke model
Figure 1 illustrates a model which contains the runs r, t, u and w, where r
is the sequence r0, r1, r2, . . . , and similarly for the other runs. In this model,
for example, t1K1r2, etc.
2.3 Satisfiability relation
The satisfiability relation |= on possible worlds and formulas is recursively de-
fined as follows:
Definition 2. Let M = 〈R, π,A,K〉 be an Modnr model. The satisfiability
relation |= satisfies:
1. ri |= q iff πri (q) = >, for q ∈ V ar,
2. ri |= β1 ∧ β2 iff ri |= β1 and ri |= β2,
3. ri |= ¬β iff not ri |= β (ri 6|= β),
4. ri |=©β iff ri+1 |= β,
5. ri |= β1Uβ2 iff there is an j > 0 such that ri+j |= β2, and for every k, such
that 0 6 k < i, rj+k |= β1,
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6. ri |= Kaβ iff r′i′ |= β for all r′i′ ∈ Ka(ri), and
7. ri |= Cβ iff for every n > 0, ri |= Enψ. 
A set of formulas is satisfiable if there is a possible world ri of a run r in
a model M such that every formula from the set holds in ri. A formula α
is satisfiable if the set {α} is satisfiable. A formula is valid (|= α) if it holds
in every ri in each model. A formula α is a semantic consequence of a set of
formulas F (F |= α) if there is no model M with a possible world ri such that
every formula from F holds in ri but α does not hold in ri.
Note that ri |= Ekβ means:
• if k = 0, ri |= β,
• if k = 1, ri |= ∧a∈AKaβ,
• if k = 2, ri |= ∧a∈AKaEβ, i.e., ri |= ∧a∈A∧b∈AKaKbβ, i.e., ri |= ∧a,b∈AKaKbβ,
etc.
In other words, Ekβ is satisfied in ri iff every formula of the form Kai1 . . . Kaikβ,
for ail ∈ A, is satisfied in ri. It follows that Cβ is satisfied in ri iff for every k
every formula of the form Kai1 . . . Kaikβ is satisfied in ri.
Since we consider models with non rigid sets of active atoms, if a 6∈ A(ri),
we have that ri |= Kaβ, for every formula β. So, it may happen that an agent
knows something that is not true, which implies that the well known property
Kaβ → β is not valid. However, since satisfiability of knowledge of a group is
represented as a conjunction of knowledge of agents from the group, the fact
that non active agents know everything does not affect knowledge of the group.
In other words, a group of agents knows β if and only if β is known by active
agents.
Following the above definitions, it can be seen that the operators F and G
intuitively mean ”eventually true in the future” and ”always true in the future”,
respectively. Also, note that in this paper we use the reflexive, strong version
of the until operator, so that if αUβ holds, then β must eventually hold, while
”the future includes the present” which means that:
• ri |= Fβ iff there is k > 0 such that ri+k |= β, and
• ri |= Gβ iff for every k > 0, ri+k |= β.
Now we can now give two finitely satisfiable sets of formulas that are unsat-
isfiable [36, 37] (p ∈ V ar):
• F1 = {¬Gp} ∪ {©np : n ∈ N}, and
• F2 = {¬Cp} ∪ {Enp : n ∈ N}.
For example, the set F1 intuitively says that p holds in every particular future
time instant, yet p does not always hold in the future. It follows from our
completeness theorem that these sets are inconsistent wrt. our proof system.
As we mentioned above, inconsistency of these sets cannot be proved wrt. any
finitary proof systems.
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2.4 Other classes of models
It is well known that the class Modnr of models characterizes a weaker form
of knowledge—belief. So, to reason about knowledge of agents we will also
consider two other classes of models. The first class corresponds to situations
in which everything that agents know is true:
Definition 3. The class Modr of models contains all Modnr-models which satis-
fies that the set of active agents is rigid and that all Ka are equivalence relations,
i.e., that:
• A(ri) = A, for every possible world ri, and
• K = {Ka : a ∈ A} is the set of reflexive, transitive and symmetric acces-
sibility relations.
In the second case, we have first to introduce a set of new propositional
letters: Aa, for every a ∈ A, with the intended meaning that an Aa holds in a
possible world iff the agent a is active in that world:
• if ri is a possible world in a model M, ri |= Aa iff a ∈ A(ri).
The second class consists of Modnr-models that satisfy an additional condi-
tion. We denote this class by Modnr+ and define it as follows.
Definition 4. The class Modnr+ of models contains all Modnr-models that sat-
isfy:
• if a ∈ A(ri), then riKari.
It is well known that in models from the class Modr everything that agents
know is true. Note that the same holds in Modnr+-models for active agents.
Also, note that for Modnr+-models the following holds: if ri |= Aa and riKar′i′ ,
then r′i′ |= Aa. Otherwise, if r′i′ 6|= Aa, then it is not r′i′Kari, which contradicts
our assumption about symmetry of Ka.
The satisfiability relation for the new classes of models can be defined in
the same way as above. In the rest of the paper, if the context is not clear,
we will use the subscripts so that |=nr, |=nr+ and |=r denote the corresponding
satisfiability relations.
Models from the class Modnr+ will be used to describe the blockchain protocol
in Section 3.2.
2.5 Axiomatization
The axiomatic system Axnr contains the following axiom schemata (AT and
AK for axioms about time and knowledge, respectively):
A all the axioms of the classical propositional logic
AT1 ¬© β ↔©¬β
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AT2 ©(β1 → β2)→ (©β1 →©β2)
AT3 β1Uβ2 ↔ β2 ∨ (β1 ∧©(β1Uβ2))
AT4 β1Uβ2 → Fβ2
AK1 (Kaβ1 ∧ Ka(β1 → β2))→ Kaβ2
AK3 Kaβ → KaKaβ
AK4 Ka¬β → Ka¬Kaβ
AK5 Cβ → Ekβ, for every k > 0,
and inference rules (RTN and RKN for necessitation for time and knowledge, re-
spectively; RIU and RIC denote the infinitary rules related to until and common
knowledge):
MP from β1 and β1 → β2 infer β2
RTN from β infer ©β
RKN from β infer Kaβ
RIU from Φk(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) for all i > 0
infer Φk(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
RIC from Φk(©sEiβ, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) for all i > 0
infer Φk(©sCβ, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N).
[AT1–AT4] are axioms of LTL (see [24]), while [AK1, AK3, AK4, AK5] are
the usual modal axioms used for reasoning about knowledge (see [15]) in the
case of non-rigid set of agents (the set of agents that are active may change). If
the set of agents is rigid, we should include an additional, so-called Knowledge
axiom:
AK2 Kaβ → β
which implies reflexivity of the accessibility relations Ka. It is also possible to
talk about knowledge of an agent a (non)active in a possible world using the
following axioms that generalize [AK2]:
AK2’ Aa → (Kaβ → β),
AK2’’ Aa → KaAa, and
AK2’’’ ¬Aa → Ka⊥.
We will show that, in the presence of [AK2’], [AK2’’] and [AK2’’’], the accessi-
bility relation Ka satisfies that if a ∈ A(ri), then riKari. Note that, we have as
a consequence of [AK2’] and [AK2’’’] that KaAa holds.
The rule [MP] is modus ponens, [RTN] and [RKN] resemble necessitation,
while [RIU] and [RIC] are infinitary inference rules that characterize the Until
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operator, and the common knowledge operator, respectively. These rules are
given in terms of k-nested implications, similarly as in [29, 39]. The structure
of [RIU] and [RIC] stems from our completeness proof and is more-or-less the
same as the structures of the rule of intersection [2], and of the infinitary nested
sequent rules for common knowledge in [6] and greatest fixed points in [7]. In
our present paper, deep inference is needed to obtain strong completeness in
the context of knowledge and time whereas in [6] and [7] deep inference was
essential to achieve syntactic cut-elimination for modal fixed point logics. In
cases when every θj is p ∨ ¬p, every Bj is an empty sequence of operators, and
s = 0, the infinitary rules have the following simpler forms:
RIU’ from ¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), for all i > 0, infer ¬(β1Uβ2)
RIC’ from Eiβ, for all i > 0, infer Cβ.
For example, [RIU’] intuitively means that if there is no future time instant in
which β2 holds, such that β1 holds in all time instants between the current time
instant and the one in which β2 holds, then β1Uβ2 does not hold in the current
time instant. Similarly, [RIC’] says that we if have Eiβ for all i, then we can
deduce that β is common knowledge.
We will use:
• Axnr+ to denote Axnr+ Axioms [AK2’, AK2’’, AK2’’’], and
• Axr to denote Axnr+ Axiom [AK2].
2.6 Soundness and Completeness
In this part we will state that our systems are sound and complete with
respect to the corresponding classes of models. Informally speaking, sound-
ness means that we cannot prove anything that is false, and (so-called weak)
completeness means that we can prove everything that is true. However, in
the sequel we will prove a stronger version of completeness, so-called strong
completeness, which says that every consistent set is satisfiable (or equivalently
that every semantic consequences of set of formula can be deduced from that
set using the above axioms and inference rules). As it was mentioned in the
Introduction, all proofs of the theorems from this section will be given in Ap-
pendix A. Similarly as above, we will use subscripts nr, nr+ and r to clarify
the context, if necessary.
The inference relation ` is defined as follows:
Definition 5. We say that β is syntactical consequence of a set of formulas
F (or that β is deducible or derivable from F ) and write F ` β iff there is a
sequence β0, . . . , βλ+1 (where λ is a finite or countable ordinal) such that:
• βλ+1 = β, and
• every βi, i ≤ λ + 1, is an axiom-instance, or βi ∈ F , or βi is derived by
an inference rule applied on some previous members of the sequence.
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A formula β is a theorem (` β) if it is deducible from the empty set. The rules
[RTN] and [RKN] can be applied only to theorems. A proof for β from F is the
corresponding sequence of formulas.
Note that the length of a proof is a countable successor ordinal.
Definition 6. A set F is inconsistent iff F ` ⊥, otherwise it is consistent. A
set F of formulas is maximal if for every formula β either β ∈ F or ¬β ∈ F .
A set F is deductively closed if for every formula β, if F ` β, then β ∈ F .
Theorem 1. [Soundness for Axnr] `nr β implies |=nr β.
Theorem 2. Every Axnr-consistent set of formulas F can be extended to a
maximal Axnr-consistent set F
∗.
Theorem 3. [Strong completeness for Axnr] Every Axnr-consistent set of for-
mulas has a Modnr-model.
Theorem 4. F |=nr β ↔ F `nr β.
Theorem 5. [Soundness and Strong completeness for Axnr+ and Axr] The ax-
iomatic system Axnr+ is sound and strongly complete wrt. the class of Modnr+-
models.
The axiomatic system Axr is sound and strongly complete wrt. the class of
Modr-models.
In the proofs of the completeness theorems we follow the Henkin procedure:
we first prove the deduction theorem, some auxiliary statements, and Linden-
baum’s theorem (which guarantees that every consistent set of formulas can be
extended to a maximal consistent set), and then demonstrate how a canonical
model can be obtained using maximal consistent sets of formulas. Finally, we
show that the considered consistent set of formulas is satisfied in the canonical
model.
3 Blockchain Protocol
In this section we will present a theory (a set of proper axioms) of our temporal
epistemic logic to describe (a simplified version of) the blockchain protocol [4, 10,
30, 34]. The protocol is used to achieve consensus in distributed environments,
for example as the base for bitcoin protocol, or some other cryptocurrency
protocol, Byzantine agreement, the notion of a public transaction ledger, smart
contracts, etc.
The following properties particularly contribute to the popularity of the
blockchain protocol:
• It is managed autonomously, without third authority.
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• It removes the possibility of infinite reproducibility from a digital asset,
i.e., it confirms that each unit of value was transferred only once, solving
the long-standing problem of double spending.
• It can assign title rights because, when properly set up to detail the ex-
change agreement, it provides a record that compels offer and acceptance.
3.1 Overview of the Blockchain Protocol
The blockchain protocol can be seen as a value-exchange protocol. It allows per-
manent recording of verifiable transactions in a distributed network. A trans-
action describes a transfer of the ownership of a property from one owner to
another one. Upon executing transactions, the corresponding (time stamped)
transactions’ data organized in blocks are added in a change-sensitive manner
at the end of a decentralized, distributed and public digital ledger (also called
blockchain, or chain). To achieve consensus about the accepted blocks, the
nodes in the network create so-called proofs-of-work, i.e., they try to solve the
unique (hard to answer, but easy to verify) hash puzzle of a new block. The
first node with a valid solution (accepted by the majority of nodes) is the win-
ner and its block is added. The ledger represents the complete history of all
approved transactions. It is immutable and ordered, and records cannot be
altered retroactively, without the alteration of all subsequent blocks and the
consensus of the network. Hashing is used to store transaction data, so that
nodes compare hash values instead of pieces of their copies of the ledger, which
allows nodes to verify and check transactions inexpensively and easily.
The blockchain protocol was introduced in the following way (quotation from
[30]):
1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
2. Each node collects new transactions into a block.
3. Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its
block.
4. When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to
all nodes.
5. Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid
and not already spent.
6. Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on cre-
ating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted
block as the previous hash.
Nodes always consider the longest chain, i.e., the one containing the
most proofs-of-work, to be the correct one and will keep working on
extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next
block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first.
In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the
other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when
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the next proof-of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the
nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the
longer one.
The above described steps (1 – 6) of the protocol execution form a round. At
any round, each node attempts to increase the length of its own chain by mining
for a new block: upon receiving some record m, it picks a random string and
checks whether the string is a valid proof-of-work (aka “cryptographic puzzle”)
with respect to m and a pointer to the last block of its current chain. If so, the
node extends its own local chain and broadcast it to the all the other nodes.
It is possible that several chains arrive approximately simultaneously in a run
of the protocol. In that case, each node chooses one of them, and works on it
(approximately half choose the first one, and the other half the second one),
keeping the other chains. This situation is called a fork. Forks are resolved
in later rounds when a new proof-of-work is found and one branch becomes
longer; the nodes that were working on the other (now shorter) branches will
then switch to the longer one.
We consider the blockchain protocol that runs in a synchronous setting. We
do not consider cryptographic properties of the protocol, and we assume that all
nodes in the network are perfectly honest and reasonable, and that there are no
dishonest nodes trying to exploit cryptographic vulnerabilities of the protocol
to gain benefits.
3.2 Temporal Epistemic Blockchain Logic
In this section we will use previously introduced notions and results related to
strongly complete axiomatization of the class of Modnr+-models. We start with
some notational conventions. In the rest of this section we will use the word
agent (more frequently used in the logic community) instead of node. The set
of agents need not to be rigid, i.e., agents are allowed to switch from active to
inactive and vice versa. A situation in which different subgroups of agents add
different blocks to the ledger and continue to work with them will be called fork,
while the word history will serve instead of ledger.
In our model we describe a run of the blockchain protocol by a linear time
logic-model with the set of time instants isomorphic to the set of non-negative
integers. However, the meaning of time instants i, i+ 1, etc. is ”the ith round”,
”the i + 1st round of an execution of the protocol”, etc. A round involves the
following steps performed by active agents:
• agents try to find a proof-of-work for the next block,
• agents broadcast their solutions (blocks) to other agents,
• agents receive those messages, each agent accepts one of the proposed
blocks and add it to its chain.
Note that in real applications the lengths of rounds of an execution of the
protocol might vary, but we abstract this and only require that rounds are
linearly ordered.
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In this paper we assume several constraints to the original execution scenario
of the protocol, since we consider blockchain protocol that runs in a synchronous
setting:
1. Blocks are sent across the network much faster than they are created.
Every new block is received by agents in the round in which the block is
produced.
2. While some messages may get lost, in every round every active agent
receives at least one new block.
3. If an agent produces a new block, it adds that block to its chain.
4. Forks will be resolved after some fixed number of rounds.
The assumption that broadcasting is much faster than creating new proof-
of-work does hold for the Bitcoin protocol [30]. The average time until an
agent receives a new block is 6.5 seconds whereas the next block will be only
produced after 10 minutes (on average) [9]. Therefore, in our model, in one
round at least one (but maybe several) proof-of-work are produced, they are
immediately broadcasted, and each agent accepts one of them. Then the next
round starts and next proofs-of-work are computed. The assumption that forks
will be resolved after some fixed number of rounds is a simplification of actual
blockchain implementations. In the Bitcoin protocol, we only have the following,
see [14, 30]:
• Let z be the number of blocks validated by the honest agents and let P (z)
be the probability that an attacker will win a double spend race (i.e., to
succeed to spend the same money more than once) to replace the blocks
of the blockchain.
• Then P (z) tends exponentially to 0 as z increases.
Hence, in practice, we only have that forks will be resolved with some (high)
probability.
The assumption of synchronicity of the considered networks is used in [10].
The paper [18] discusses networks with a ∆-bounded delays, but [34] explains
that every synchronous protocol can be seen as a ∆-delayed (i.e., agents are
required to wait certain period). So, in case when all agents are considered
honest, and there are no adversaries to benefit from ∆-times increasing of their
computational power, the assumption about asynchronicity can be neglected.
We will now introduce a formal theory for our blockchain model. Since we
want to reason about knowledge of agents that can alternately become active
and nonactive, as the base logic we will use the one axiomatized by Axnr+, and
we consider models from the class of Modnr+.
We define:
• POW = {powa,i|a ∈ A, i ∈ N} is a set of atomic propositions, with the
intended meaning of powa,i that the agent a produces a proof-of-work for
round i, and
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• ACC = {acca,b,i|a, b ∈ A, i ∈ N} is a set of atomic propositions, with the
intended meaning of acca,b,i that the agent a accepts the proof-of-work
produced for round i by the agent b.
We set
ea,i :=
∧
b∈A
(Ab → accb,a,i)
The formulas ea,i mean that every active agent accepts the proof-of-work pro-
duced for round i by agent a.
Further we set
echb,i :=
∨
a∈A
accb,a,i
The formula echb,i means that agent b accepts some proof-of-work produced for
round i.
We will use z ∈ N for the fixed number of rounds after which forks are
resolved.
Our theory of the blockchain protocol consists of the following proper axioms
(let a, b and c denote agents from A):
AB1
∨
aAa
AB2 accb,a,i → powa,i
AB3 accb,a,i → Kbaccb,a,i
AB4 accb,a,i → ¬accb,c,i, for each c 6= a
AB5 acca,c,j ∧©accb,a,i →©accb,c,j , for j < i
AB6 Ab ∧
∨
a powa,i → echb,i
AB7 echa,i → Aa
AB8 echa,i+1 → echa,i
AB9 echb,i →©
∨
a powa,i+1
AB10 ¬echa,i → ¬© powa,i+1
AB11 echa,i+z ∧ acca,b,i → eb,i
The theory of the blockchain protocol not only contains the above axioms,
but also their ©- and E-closures, i.e., we can prefix the formulas with any
number of ©- and E-operators. That basically means the formulas always hold
and they are common knowledge among the participants of the blockchain.
Let us briefly discuss the meaning of the above axioms.
AB1 There is always at least one agent active.
AB2 One can only accept proof-of-work that has been produced.
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AB3 The agents know if they accept some proof-of-work.
AB4 An agent accepts at most one proof-of-work for a given round.
AB5 If a accepts c’s proof of work for round j and (in the next step) b accepts a’s
proof-of-work for a later round, then b must also accept c’s proof-of-work
for round j. This essentially means that if b accepts a’s proof-of-work,
then b accepts the whole history of a.
AB6 If proofs-of-work for some round are produced, then each active agent
must accept one of them. Note that we do not have any assumption on
how an agent accepts a proof.
AB7 Only active agents can accept proofs-of-work.
AB8 If an agent accepts some proof-of-work for round i+1, then the agent also
accepts some proof-of-work for round i.
AB9 If an agent accepts some proof-of-work for round i, then in the next round
a proof-of-work for round i+ 1 must be available.
AB10 Only an agent that has accepted a proof-of-work for round i can create
(in the next step) a proof-of-work for round i + 1. This models the fact
that a proof-of-work depends on the previously accepted history.
AB11 This says that possible forks are resolved at least after z rounds. Note
that we do not have any assumption on how this consensus is achieved.
This formalizes the common prefix property from [10].
Let us now briefly discuss the relationship between time instants (from the
linear time logic part) and rounds (referenced in the atomic propositions in
POW and ACC).
We start at time instant t and assume that agent b accepts some proof of
work for round i, that means agent b accepts a blockchain of length i. Because
of [AB9], at time instant t + 1 some agent a will produce a proof-of-work for
round i + 1. By [AB1] at least one agent, say agent c, will be active at time
instant t+ 1. By [AB6] agent c at time instant t+ 1 accepts some proof of work
for round i+ 1, that means a blockchain of length i+ 1. Hence with every time
instant, the accepted blockchain grows by one block.
However, we do not require that all proof-of-work for round i+1 is generated
at time instant t + 1. It is possible that some proof-of-work for round i + 1 is
produced at a later time instant.
Lemma 1. The set of Blockchain Axioms is satisfiable.
Proof. Construction of the model. Let A = {a}, R = {r}, Ka(ri) = {ri},
a ∈ A(ri), for i ≥ 0, z = 1 and
• ri |= powa,i−k iff 0 6 k 6 i,
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• ri |= acca,a,i−k iff 0 6 k 6 i,
• ri |= ¬acca,a,i′ iff i 6 i′.
This model satisfies the Blockchain axioms.
A trivial consequence of [AB4] is that there cannot be an agreement of
acceptance of two different proofs-of-work.
Lemma 2. We have ea,i → ¬eb,i for b 6= a.
Now we show that the common history persists, i.e., agreements cannot be
undone.
Lemma 3. We have ea,i →©ea,i.
Proof. Assume ea,i. We first show for any agents b and c that
© accb,c,i+1 → accc,a,i. (1)
Assume ©accb,c,i+1. By [AB2] we get ©powc,i+1. By [AB10] we obtain echc,i.
Since we assume ea,i, this yields accc,a,i by [AB7]. Hence (1) is established.
Next we show for any agent b∨
c
©accb,c,i+1 →©accb,a,i. (2)
Because of (1) we find that
∨
c©accb,c,i+1 implies∨
c
(accc,a,i ∧©accb,c,i+1)
From [AB5] we have∨
c
(accc,a,i ∧©accb,c,i+1)→©accb,a,i
Thus we conclude ©accb,a,i and (2) is established
From ea,i and [AB1] we get
∨
b accb,a,i. Then [AB9] yields ©
∨
c powc,i+1.
Thus from [AB6] we get ∧
b
(©Ab →©echb,i+1).
Observe that ©echb,i+1 is equivalent to
∨
c©accb,c,i+1. Hence by (2) we find∧
b
(©Ab →©accb,a,i),
which is equivalent to ©ea,i.
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The next lemma says that if any of the agents has a choice in a round, then
each active agent has its own choice in the same round.
Lemma 4. We have Ab ∧ echa,i → echb,i.
Proof. From echa,i we obtain by [AB2] that
∨
c powc,i. This together with Ab
implies by [AB6] that echb,i holds.
Theorem 6 states sufficient conditions that guarantee that common knowl-
edge can be obtained.
Theorem 6. We have
echa,i+z ∧ acca,b,i → Ceb,i
Proof. Let c be an arbitrary agent. Using [AB3] we find
echc,i+z → Kcechc,i+z
and
accc,b,i → Kcaccc,b,i.
Hence by the E closure of [AB11] we find
echc,i+z ∧ accc,b,i → Kceb,i.
Using Lemma 4 we get
Ac ∧ echa,i+z ∧ accc,b,i → Kceb,i.
We have that Ac ∧ eb,s → accc,b,s. Thus we obtain
Ac ∧ echa,i+z ∧ eb,i → Kceb,i.
We have that ¬Ac → Kc⊥. Hence we have
echa,i+z ∧ eb,i → Kceb,i.
Since c was arbitrary, this gives us
echa,i+z ∧ eb,i → Eeb,i.
We even have
Ek(echa,i+z ∧ eb,i → Eeb,i)
for all k ∈ N since all our assumptions are E-closed. Thus we obtain
echa,i+z ∧ eb,i → Ekeb,i
for all k ∈ N. Using [AB11] and [RIC] we finally conclude
echa,i+z ∧ acca,b,i → Ceb,i.
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As a corollary we get the following result.
Corollary 1. The active agents have unique common history up to the last z
rounds:
echa,i+z →
i∧
k=0
(acca,b,k → Ceb,k).
Proof. Let 0 ≤ k ≤ i. From echa,i+z we find by [AB8] that echa,k+z. By
Theorem 6 we find
acca,b,k → Ceb,k,
which yields the desired result.
This property can be compared with the persistence property of [10]—a
transaction that goes more than k blocks “deep” into the blockchain of one hon-
est player will be included in every honest player’s blockchain with overwhelming
probability, and it will be assigned a permanent position in the ledger. So, The-
orem 1 corresponds to [10, Theorem 15], [18, Theorem 5.2] and [34, Claim 6.2].
In our opinion, beside differences related to our proof-theoretic approach and
the approach from [18] which is model-theoretic, the assumptions about the pro-
tocol formalized by the above given axioms are somehow more primitive than
the ones given in [18]. That is why we can express, for example, how ledgers
are changed in each round and how acceptance (by an agent) of a proof-of-work
produced by another agent affects the ledger of the former agent, while [18]
mostly discuss how a consensus between all agents can be achieved.
[AB11] states that forks will be resolved after a fixed number of rounds.
Another possibility how forks can be resolved is when in a round only one
proof-of-work is available. In that case, everyone has to accept the unique
proof-of-work, i.e., everyone agrees on it.
Lemma 5. The following is common knowledge: powb,i ∧
∧
c6=b ¬powc,i → eb,i.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that ¬acca,b,s for some a with Aa.
From powb,i and Aa we get by [AB6] that echa,i. Because of ¬acca,b,s we have∨
d 6=b acca,d,i. Hence by [AB2] we conclude
∨
d 6=b powd,i, which contradicts the
assumption
∧
c6=b ¬powc,i. Thus
powb,i ∧
∧
c6=b
¬powc,i → eb,i (3)
is established. Since our theory includes the E-closure of [AB6] and [AB2],
we also have the E-closure of (3) and by [RIC] finally also common knowledge
of (3).
In Theorem 6 we showed that after a fixed number of rounds, we not only
have an agreement, but also that this agreement is common knowledge. In the
case of the previous lemma, we also get an agreement, but there, the agreement
is not common knowledge. To obtain common knowledge of a unique proof-of-
work, we need an additional assumption about the blockchain protocol.
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AB12 ¬powa,i → E¬powa,i
[AB12] states that if agent a does not produce a proof-of-work in the round i,
then everybody knows that. From [AB1]–[AB11] it follows that in each round
each agent receives at least one of the generated proofs-of-work. [AB12] requires
that each agent receives all generated proofs-of-work. Note that this means that
all messages will not be delayed or lost, which is a stronger assumption than the
one used so far (“while some messages may get lost, in every round every active
agent receives at least one new block”). Under this additional assumption,
we can show that a unique proof-of-work leads to common knowledge. This
property can be compared to liveness property in [10]: every transaction is
eventually executed and every participant includes it in their own ledger.
Theorem 7. Assume our blockchain theory also includes (the E-closure of)
[AB12]. Then we have powb,i ∧
∧
c6=b ¬powc,i → Ceb,i.
Proof. We first show
powb,i ∧
∧
c 6=b
¬powc,i → Epowb,i ∧ Eeb,i. (4)
Assume powb,i ∧
∧
c 6=b ¬powc,i. By Lemma 5 we get eb,i. For any a with Aa
we get acca,b,i and by [AB3] also Kaacca,b,i. Thus, by [AB2] Kapowb,i. Since a
was arbitrary (and by ¬Aa =⇒ Ka⊥), we get E powb,i. Further [AB12] yields∧
c 6=b E¬powc,i. Thus by Lemma 5 we find Eeb,i and (4) is established.
Since our theory includes the E-closure of [AB2], [AB3], and [AB12], we not
only have (4) but also its E-closure, i.e.
Ek(powb,i ∧
∧
c 6=b
¬powc,i → Epowb,i ∧ Eeb,i) for all k ∈ N. (5)
Now observe that by the the E-closure of [AB12]
¬powa,i → Ek¬powa,i for all k ∈ N.
Therefore, using (5) we find
powb,i ∧
∧
c6=b
¬powc,i → Ekeb,i for all k ∈ N.
By [RIC], we finally conclude
powb,i ∧
∧
c6=b
¬powc,i → Ceb,i.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a strongly complete axiomatization of three related
temporal epistemic logics which differ in the approach to the ability of agents to
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join or leave the system. We employ this framework for an axiomatic approach
to study the blockchain protocol in a synchronous setting in which agents are
allowed to enter/leave the network. We investigate which assumptions about a
blockchain protocol entail which properties of the protocol. In particular, we
show how blockchains can be used to achieve common knowledge among a set
of agents.
In this paper we use the notion “proof-of-work” to denote production of a
solution of a problem related to a set of transactions, without considering what
a transaction represents (it can be a transfer of bitcoins, or a smart contract,
etc.), or what is the procedure to obtain a solution (it can be proof-of-work used
for bitcoins, but also proof-of-memory, proof-of-authority, proof-of-stake, etc.).
Also, we do not assume any specific way to achieve consensus between agents
(it can be acceptance of fastest solution, Byzantine agreement, etc.).
We plan to extend our formal framework to support a more general modeling
of blockchains. One of possible directions is to add probability operators to the
formal language, so that we can express statements like: “Older transactions
have a higher probability of not being reversed”. Another challenge will be to
use our approach in automated reasoning about the blockchain protocol (using
proof assistants like, e.g., Coq or Isabelle/HOL).
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[6] K. Brünnler, T. Studer. Syntactic cut-elimination for common knowledge.
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 160 (1), 82–95, 2009.
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[14] C. Grunspan, R. Pérez-Marco. Double spend races. ArXiv e-prints
1702.02867. 2017
[15] R. Fagin, J. Halpern, Y. Moses, M. Y. Vardi. Reasoning About Knowledge.
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995.
[16] J. Halpern, R. Fagin. Modelling knowledge and action in distributed sys-
tems. Distributed Computing 3, 159–177, 1989.
[17] J. Halpern, Y. Moses. Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed
environment. Journal of the ACM 37:3, 549–587, 1990.
23
[18] J. Halpern, R. Pass. A Knowledge-Based Analysis of the Blockchain Proto-
col. In J. Lang, edt., Proceedings of the Sixteenth Conference on Theoretical
Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2017, Liverpool, UK, 24–26
July 2017. Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 251,
324–335, 2017. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08751v1.pdf
[19] J. Halpern, R. van der Meyden and M. Vardi. Complete axiomatizations
for reasoning about knowledge and time. SIAM Journal on Computing 33:2,
674–703, 2004.
[20] J. Hintikka. Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the
Two Notions. Cornell University Press, 1962.
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A Proofs
Theorem 1. [Soundness for Axnr] `nr β implies |=nr β.
Proof. Validity of the axioms and rules [MP], [RTN] and [RKN] can be proved
in a standard way (see [26, 31, 32]).
RIU From Φk(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1)∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), for all i > 0, infer
Φk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
We will show by induction that [RIU] produces valid formulas from valid
sets of premises.
Suppose that
rs |= Φk(©m¬((
i−1∧
l=0
©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), for i > 0.
Induction base. Let k = 0.
If rs 6|= θ0 →©m¬(β1Uβ2) then
rs |= θ0 ∧©m(β1Uβ2) iff
rs |= θ0 and rs |=©m(β1Uβ2) iff
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rs |= θ0, rs+m+i0 |= β2, and rs+m+l |= β1, for some i0 > 0, and 0 6 l < i0
(6)
On the other hand, rs |= θ0 →©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1)∧©iβ2) for all i > 0 iff
for all i > 0
rs |= ¬θ0 or rs+m+i 6|= β2 or rs+m+l 6|= β1, 0 6 l < i (7)
which contradicts (6).
Inductive step. Let
rs |= Φk+1(©m¬((
i−1∧
l=0
©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
for all i > 0, i.e.,
rs |= θk+1 → BkΦk(©m¬((
i−1∧
l=0
©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) (8)
for all i > 0.
Let us assume the opposite:
rs 6|= Φk+1(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), i.e.,
rs |= θk+1 ∧ ¬BkΦk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N). (9)
From (8) and (9) we have:
rs |= BkΦk(©m¬((
i−1∧
l=0
©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
for all i > 0, and
rs 6|= BkΦk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N).
Assume now that Bk is empty. Then, by the induction hypothesis from
rs |= Φk(©m¬((
i−1∧
l=0
©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
for all i > 0, we infer
rs |= Φk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N).
Next, assume that Bk = ©B′k and that the statement can be proved for
B′k. Then we have:
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rs |= ©B′kΦk(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧ ©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), for all
i > 0, iff
rs+1 |= B′kΦk(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧ ©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), for all
i > 0, iff
by I.H. rs+1 |= B′kΦk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) iff
rs |=©B′kΦk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N).
Finally, let Bk = KeB
′
k. Then, for every r
j′
s′ ∈ Ke(rs) we have that:
rj
′
s′ |= B
′
kΦk(©m¬((
i−1∧
l=0
©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
for all i > 0, and by the induction hypothesis
rj
′
s′ |= B
′
kΦk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N).
Therefore:
rs |= KeB′kΦk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
which is a contradiction.
RIC can be proved similarly.
Theorem 8 (Deduction theorem). T ∪ {ϕ} ` ψ implies T ` ϕ→ ψ.
Proof. If ψ is an axiom or ψ ∈ T , then T ` ψ, so since T ` ψ → (ϕ → ψ)
(Axiom [A]), by [MP] T ` ϕ→ ψ. If ϕ = ψ then T ` ϕ→ ϕ by Axiom [A].
If ψ is a theorem then, ` ©ψ. By weakening T ` ©ψ, so T ` ϕ → ©ψ.
Similarly for [RKN] rule.
Let us assume that ψ is obtained from T ∪ {ϕ} using [RIU] rule, i.e. ψ =
Φk(¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N). Then we have:
T, ϕ ` Φk(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) for all i > 0,
T ` ϕ → Φk(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧ ©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), by induction
hypothesis,
T ` ϕ→ (θk → Bk−1Φk−1(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1)∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)),
by the definition of Φk
T ` (ϕ ∧ θk) → Bk−1Φk−1(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N),
by propositional tautology (p→ (q → r))↔ ((p ∧ q)→ r).
If (θ̄j)j∈N denotes the sequence which coincides everywhere with (θj)j∈N
for j 6= k, with the exception that θ̄k ≡ ϕ ∧ θk we get that:
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T ` θ̄k → Bk−1Φk−1(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θ̄j)j∈N),
T ` Φk(©m¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θ̄j)j∈N) for all i > 0,
T ` Φk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θ̄j)j∈N) by [RIU]
T ` (ϕ ∧ θk)→ Bk−1Φk−1(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θ̄j)j∈N)
T ` ϕ→ (θk → Bk−1Φk−1(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N))
T ` ϕ→ Φk(©m¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N))
T ` ϕ→ ψ.
The same holds for [RIC].
Definition 7. For a given set of formulas T ,
∗T = {∗α|α ∈ T}, ∗−1(T ) = {α| ∗ α ∈ T}
for ∗ ∈ {Ka, C,©, }. 
For example, K−1a (T ) = {α|Kaα ∈ T}.
Lemma 6. Let α, β be formulas:
LF1 ` Gβ ↔ β ∧©Gβ,
LF2 ` G© β ↔©Gβ,
LF3 (©β1 →©β2)→©(β1 → β2),
LF4 (©β1 ∧©β2)↔©(β1 ∧ β2),
LF5 (©β1 ∨©β2)↔©(β1 ∨ β2),
LF6 Gβ ` ©iβ, i > 0,
LF7 if ` β then ` Gβ,
LF8 if T ` β, where T is a set of formulas, then ©T ` ©β,
LF9 for j > 0, ©jβ2,©0β1, . . . ,©j−1β1 ` β1Uβ2,
LK if T ` γ, where T is a set of formulas, then KeT ` Keγ.
Proof. LF1 ` Gβ ↔ β ∧©Gβ
` ¬(>U¬β)↔ ¬(¬β∨(>∧©(>U¬β))) (by definition of G and [AT3])
` ¬(>U¬β)↔ β ∧ (⊥ ∨©¬(>U¬β)) (by [AT1])
` ¬(>U¬β)↔ β ∧©¬(>U¬β) (property of ∨)
` Gβ ↔ β ∧©Gβ (by definition of G)
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LF2–LF7 The proofs are the consequences of the temporal part of the above
axiomatization.
LF8 if T ` β, where T is a set of formulas, then ©T ` ©β
We will prove this by the induction on the length of the proof of β from
T . Suppose that β is obtained by the inference rule [MP] from β2 → β1
and β2. Then we have:
©T ` ©(β2 → β1) (induction hypothesis)
©T ` ©(β2 → β1)→ (©β2 →©β1) [AT2]
©T ` ©β2 →©β1 [MP]
©T ` ©β2 (induction hypothesis)
©T ` ©β1 [MP]
Similarly we can prove the cases when β is obtained using [RTN] and
[RKN]. Suppose that
β = Φk(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
= θk → Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
is obtained by the inference rule [RIU]. Recall that Bk is a sequence of
alternating blocks of the operators © and Ka. Then:
©T ` ©Φk(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), for i > 0,
by the induction hypothesis
©T ` ©(θk → Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1)∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)),
for i > 0
©T ` ©
(
θk → Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
)
→(
©θk →©Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
)
,
for i > 0, by [AT2]
©T ` ©θk →©Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1)∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N),
for i > 0, by [MP]
©T ` (©θk →©Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)), by [RIU]
©T ` (©θk →©Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N))→
(©(θk → Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N))), by (LF3)
©T ` ©(θk → Bk−1Φk−1(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)), by [MP]
©T ` ©Φk(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N).
The proof which concerns the rule [RIC] is similar.
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LF9 for j > 0, ©jβ2,©0β1, . . . ,©j−1β1 ` β1Uβ2
By propositional reasoning we can obtain:
©jβ2,©0β1, . . . ,©j−1β1 `β2 ∨ (β1 ∧ (©β2 ∨ (©β1 ∧ (. . .
(©j−1β2 ∨ (©j−1β1 ∧ (©jβ2∨
(©jβ1 ∧©j+1(β1Uβ2)))))) . . .))).
Since
` β∨(α∧(©β∨(©α∧(. . . (©j−1β∨(©j−1α∧(©jβ∨(©jα∧©j+1(αUβ)))))) . . .)))→ αUβ
can be gained using [AT3], we have
©jβ2,©0β1, . . . ,©j−1β1 ` β1Uβ2.
LK if T ` β, where T is a set of formulas, then KeT ` Keβ.
We use the transfinite induction on the length of the proof T ` β. Suppose
that T ` β where β ≡ Φk(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)) is obtained using
[RIU].Then:
T ` Φk(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), for all i ≥ 0
KeT ` KeΦk(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), for all i ≥
0, by the induction hypothesis
KeT ` > → KeΦk(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧ ©iβ2), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N), for
all i ≥ 0, by propositional reasoning
KeT ` Φk+1(©s¬((
∧i−1
l=0©lβ1) ∧©iβ2), (θ̄j)j∈N), where (θ̄j)j∈N is a
nested k + 1-sequence such that θ̄k+1 ≡ >, θ̄k ≡ Keθk, and otherwise
coincides with (Keθj)j∈N
KeT ` Φk+1(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θ̄j)j∈N)), by [RIU]
KeT ` > → KeΦk(©s¬(β1Uβ2), (θ̄j)j∈N))
KeT ` Keβ.
The case for the rule [RIC] is similar.
Theorem 2. Every Axnr-consistent set of formulas F can be extended to a
maximal Axnr-consistent set F
∗.
Proof. Let us assume that For = {βi|i > 0} is the set of all formulas. The
maximally consistent set T ∗ is defined recursively, as follows:
1. T0 = T ,
2. If βi is consistent with Ti then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {βi},
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3. If βi is not consistent with Ti and has the form Φk(©s¬(β
′
Uβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N))
then
Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬βi,¬Φk(©s¬((
i0−1∧
l=0
©lβ
′
) ∧©i0β
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)}
where i0 is a nonnegative integer such that Ti+1 is consistent,
4. If βi is not consistent with Ti and has the form Φk(Cβ, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
then
Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬βi,¬Φk(©sEi0β, (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)}
where i0 is a nonnegative integer such that Ti+1 is consistent,
5. Otherwise Ti+1 = Ti,
6. T ∗ =
⋃
n>0 Tn.
The sets obtained by the steps 2 or 5 are obviously consistent. Let us consider
the step 3. If
¬Φk(©s¬((
n−1∧
l=0
©lβ
′
) ∧©nβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
is not consistent with Ti for every n > 0 then by Deduction theorem,
Ti ` Φk(¬(©s(
n−1∧
l=0
©lβ
′
) ∧©nβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)
for every n > 0, and by [RIU] we have
Ti ` Φk(©s¬(β
′
Uβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N))
which contradicts the assumption. Thus, the set Ti obtained by the step 3 is also
consistent. In a similar way we can prove that the step 4 produces consistent
sets.
Since the construction guarantees that for each β
′ ∈ For, either β′ ∈ T ∗
or ¬β′ ∈ T ∗, it follows that T ∗ is maximal. T ∗ does not contain all formulas
because it is not possible that both βi and βj = ¬βi belong to T1+max{i,j}.
Finally, to prove that T ∗ is deductively closed, it is sufficient to prove that
it is closed under the inference rules. We will only prove closeness under the
inference rule [RIU], and the other cases follow similarly.
Suppose that
Φk(©s¬(β
′
Uβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)) /∈ T ∗
while
Φk(©s¬((
n−1∧
l=0
©lβ
′
) ∧©nβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) ∈ T ∗
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for every n > 0. By maximality of T ∗,
¬Φk(©s¬(β
′
Uβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) ∈ T ∗.
If βi = Φk(©s¬(β
′
Uβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)), then, by the construction of T
∗ there
is i0 such that
¬Φk(©s¬((
i0−1∧
l=0
©lβ
′
) ∧©i0β
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) ∈ Ti
which contradicts the fact that
Φk(¬((
n−1∧
l=0
©lβ
′
) ∧©nβ
′′
), (θj)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) ∈ T ∗
for every n > 0.
Canonical structure.
Let W be the family of all maximal consistent sets. For every W ∈ W we
consider the following sequence of sets of formulas W0 = W , and Ws = {β :
©β ∈ Ws−1}, s > 0. We can prove that every set in that sequence is maximal
and consistent.
Lemma 7. Every Ws is a maximal consistent set.
Proof. The proof is by induction on s. By the assumption every W0 is maximal
and consistent. Let s > 0 and Ws be maximal and consistent.
Suppose that Ws+1 is not maximal. There is a formula β such that {β,¬β}∩
Ws+1 = ∅. Consequently, {©β,©¬β}∩Ws = ∅, which is in contradiction with
maximality of Ws.
Suppose that Ws+1 is not consistent, i.e., Ws+1 ` β ∧ ¬β, for any formula
β. By [LF8], ©Ws+1 ` ©(β ∧ ¬β) and Ws ` ©(β ∧ ¬β). By [LF4] and [AT1]
we can show that Ws ` ©β ∧¬© β, which is in contradiction with consistency
of Ws.
Next, we define a special, so called canonical structure
M∗ = 〈R, π,A,K〉
such that:
• for every W ∈ W, a run is the sequence rW = 〈W0,W1, . . .〉, where W =
W0, and R is a set of runs,
• for every propositional letter q, πrWi (q) = > iff q ∈Wi,
• for an agent a, a ∈ A(ri) iff there is no formula β such that Kaβ∧Ka¬β ∈
Wi,
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• rWi KarW
′
i′ iff K
−1
a (Wi) ⊂W ′i′ .
Note that, if a 6∈ A(rWi ), i.e., there is a formula β such that Kaβ ∧Ka¬β ∈Wi,
then β ∧ ¬β ∈ K−1a (Wi). Since every W ′i′ is consistent there is no W ′i′ such that
K−1a (Wi) ⊂W ′i′ , and Ka(rWs ) is empty. Furthermore, if there is a formula β such
that Kaβ∧Ka¬β ∈Wi and a 6∈ A(rWi ), then since ` ⊥ → γ and ` Ka(β∧¬β)↔
Kaβ ∧Ka¬β, we have that from for every formula γ, Kaγ ∧Ka¬γ ∈Wi.
The axioms AK3 and AK4 guarantee that every Ka is transitive and sym-
metric.
Theorem 3. [Strong completeness for Axnr] Every Axnr-consistent set of for-
mulas has a Modnr-model.
Proof. Let M∗ = 〈R, π,A,K〉 be the above defined canonical structure. We will
prove that β ∈ Wi iff rWi |= β by induction on the rank of β where the rank
function rk(·) is defined such that
1. rk(γ1) < rk(γ) if γ1 is a proper subformula of γ;
2. rk(Eiγ) < rk(Cγ) for every i.
This may be achieved by assigning ordinal ranks to formulas, in particular
setting rk(Cγ) := ω + rk(γ). A detailed discussion of such a rank function is
given in [6].
We distinguish the following cases for β:
• if β is a propositional letter, the statement is an immediate consequence
of the definition of πr
W
i .
• The proof in the cases when β is a negation or a conjunction is standard.
• β =©β1.
rWi |=©β1 iff rWi+1 |= β1 iff β1 ∈Wi+1 iff ©β1 ∈Wi.
• β = β1Uβ2.
Suppose that rWi |= β1Uβ2. There is some k > 0 such that ri+k |= β2 and
for every l, 0 6 l < k, ri+l |= β1. By the induction hypothesis, β2 ∈Wi+k,
for k > 0, and β1 ∈ Wi+l, for 0 6 l < k. By the construction of M∗, we
have that:
– ©kβ2 ∈Wi, for some k > 0, and
– ©lβ1 ∈Wi, for 0 6 l < k.
Thus, by Lemma 6.[LF9], we have that β1Uβ2 ∈Wi.
For the other direction, assume that β1Uβ2 ∈ Wi. By Axiom AT4, Fβ2 ∈
Wi. Thus, G¬β2 6∈Wi. By the definition of G and the construction of M∗ it
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means that ¬(>U¬β2) 6∈ Wi, and > → ©i¬(>U¬β2) 6∈ W0. Furthermore,
by Theorem 2, for some k0,
¬
(
> → (©i¬((
k0−1∧
l=0
©l>) ∧©k0β2))
)
∈W0.
It follows that for some k0, ©i+k0β2 ∈W0.
Let k′0 = min{k0 : ©i+k0β2 ∈ W0}. If k′0 = 0, it means that β2 ∈ Wi, so
by the induction hypothesis rWi |= β2, and rWi |= β1Uβ2. Next, let k′0 > 0.
Then, we have that ¬β2 ∈Wi, . . . ,Wi+k′0−1. Since, by Axiom AT3
β2∨(β1∧(©β2∨(©β1∧. . .∧(©k
′
0−1β2∨(©k
′
0−1β1∧©k
′
0(β1Uβ2) . . .) ∈Wi
we have that β1 ∈ Wi, . . . ,Wi+k′0−1, β2 ∈ Wi+k′0 , and by the induction
hypothesis rWi |= β1, . . . , ri+k′0−1 |= β1, ri+k′0 |= β2. Thus, r
W
i |= β1Uβ2.
• β = Kaβ1.
Suppose that Kaβ1 ∈Wi. If i 6∈ A(rWi ), then Ka(rWi ) is empty, and trivially
rWi |= Kaβ1. So, let i ∈ A(rWi ). Then β1 ∈ K−1a (Wi), and for every rW
′
i′
such that rWi KarW
′
i′ (by the definition of relation Ka) β1 ∈ W ′i′ . By the
induction hypothesis we have that rW
′
i′ |= β1 (for every rW
′
i′ such that
rWi KarW
′
i′ ), and r
W
i |= Kaβ1.
Conversely, let rWi |= Kaβ1. If i 6∈ A(rWi ), then obviously, Kaβ1 ∈ Wi.
So, suppose that i ∈ A(rWi ) and Kaβ1 6∈ W js . Then K−1a (Wi) ∪ {¬β1} is
consistent. Otherwise, by Deduction theorem we have K−1a (Wi) ` β1, and
since Wi ⊃ Ka(K−1a (Wi)) ` Kaβ1, by Lemma 6.[LK] and maximality of Wi,
it follows that Kaβ1 ∈Wi, which is a contradiction. Thus, K−1a (Wi)∪{¬β1}
can be extended to a maximal consistent set W ′i′ , such that r
W
i KarW
′
i′ .
Since ¬β1 ∈W ′i′ , then by the induction hypothesis rW
′
i′ |= ¬β1, and rWi 6|=
Kaβ1, which is a contradiction.
• β = Cβ1.
Suppose that Cβ1 ∈ Wi. By Axiom AK5, for every i > 0, Ekβ1 ∈ Wi,
which means that every formula of the form Ka1 . . . Kakβ1 belongs to Wi,
and by the previous case, it is satisfied in rWi . Thus, r
W
i |= Ekβ1, for every
k, and rWi |= Cβ1.
For the other direction, let rWi |= Cβ1. Suppose that Cβ1 6∈ Wi and
©iCβ1 6∈W0, i.e.,
Φ0(©iCβ1, (>)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) 6∈W0.
Since rWi |= Ekβ1, for every i, we have that:
– every formula of the form Ka1 . . . Kaiβ1 is satisfied in r
W
i and, by the
previous case, belongs to Wi,
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– every formula of the form ©iKa1 . . . Kaiβ1 belongs to W0, and
– for every i, ©iEkβ1 ∈W0.
On the other hand, since Φ0(©iCβ1, (>)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N) 6∈ W0, by the con-
struction of M∗ we have that
¬Φ0(©iEi0β1, (>)j∈N, (Bj)j∈N)} ∈W0
for some i0, i.e.,
¬©i Ei0β1 ∈W0,
a contradiction. It follows that Cβ1 ∈Wi.
Theorem 5. [Soundness and Strong completeness for Axnr+ and Axr] The ax-
iomatic system Axnr+ is sound and strongly complete wrt. the class of Modnr+-
models.
The axiomatic system Axr is sound and strongly complete wrt. the class of
Modr-models.
Proof. We give a sketch of the proof of this statement. First, it is well known
that if Axiom [AK2] is added to Axnr, all accessibility relations become equiva-
lence relations, hence, from Theorem 3, it follows that Axr is sound and strongly
complete wrt. the class of Modr-models. Regarding Axnr+, we first slightly
change the definition of the above defined canonical structure M∗:
• for an agent a, a ∈ A(rWi ) iff Aa belongs to the corresponding Wi.
Axiom [AK2’] guarantees that, if Aa ∈Wi, then K−1a (Wi) ⊂Wi, i.e., for the cor-
responding possible world rWi , r
W
i KarWi . Furthermore, Axiom [AK2’’’] implies
that, if Aa 6∈ Wi, then ⊥ ∈ K−1a (Wi), i.e., K−1a (Wi) is inconsistent, and there is
no consistent set of formulas which contains it. Hence, in that case Ka(ri) = ∅.
Finally, from Axiom [AK2’’] we obtain that, if Aa ∈ Wi, then Aa ∈ K−1a (Wi).
It means that for every rW
′
i′ accessible by Ka from r
W
i , Aa belongs to the corre-
sponding W ′i′ , and that Ka⊥ 6∈ W ′i′ . Thus, K−1a (W ′i′) is not inconsistent, which
in combination with Axiom [AK4] guarantees symmetry of Ka. It follows that
Axnr+ is sound and strongly complete wrt. the class of Modnr+-models.
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